Argument, evidence and the British constitution
The Attorney General serves both the Crown and the governing party. That dual role is sustainable only if the public can see where legal advice ends and political preference begins. A statutory conflict test, with published recusal criteria and a Commons statement when advice is overridden, would strengthen rather than weaken ministerial government.
Ministerial resignation letters are too often published late, redacted beyond usefulness, or replaced by a short press statement. A 30-day statutory publication duty, with narrow exemptions and a public redaction register, would turn a discretionary courtesy into a constitutional obligation.
Before a single MP rises to speak, a bill touching the royal prerogative or the Crown's private affairs must be blessed by King's Consent — a procedure agreed behind closed doors and recorded almost nowhere. The narrow case for protecting the Crown's own property is real; the wider veto over Parliament's business is not. Here is a reform that a monarchist can defend without flinching.
Repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act restored flexibility, but it left Britain without a settled procedure for confidence defeats, hung Parliaments and dissolution. A short statutory code could end the guesswork without codifying the constitution.
There are few areas of the British state where so much public money, so much regulatory power and so little routine parliamentary attention coincide as in the arm's-length body. A default ten-year sunset, coupled with an affirmative vote on renewal, would impose a discipline that ministers and the Commons have so far declined to impose on themselves.
The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 promised Parliament a statutory role in treaty ratification, but its negative 21-day window gives MPs little practical leverage over major post-Brexit agreements. A stronger scrutiny reserve, not an American-style Senate veto, is the constitutional upgrade 2026 needs.
Comprehensive Lords reform has defeated every government since 1911. A statutory ceiling on membership, a working attendance threshold and a genuinely independent appointments committee would deliver most of the benefit at a fraction of the constitutional cost.
Judicial review of manifesto commitments is now routine, and the response to defeat is too often improvised. A short, published protocol — reasoning, remedies and a parliamentary statement — would let ministers absorb a loss without ignoring the judgment or attacking the bench.
Decentralisation is easy to praise in opposition and hard to deliver in government. A practical centre-right list of five powers — from skills funding to planning appeals — that should move from Whitehall to combined authorities and councils in 2026, with the accountability risks spelled out.
The Judicial Appointments Commission has kept party politics out of judicial selection, but it has wrapped its choices in a language of merit that is increasingly hard to scrutinise. A centre-right constitutional case for published competency frameworks and limited pre-appointment hearings — without turning judges into political appointees.
Secondary legislation now carries much of the practical content of modern government, yet parliamentary scrutiny remains thin, late and easily bypassed. The 2026 legislative programme has made the problem sharper by delegating broad powers to ministers. A reinforced affirmative-plus procedure and a standing scrutiny committee with real authority would restore Parliament's grip without inviting judicial substitution.
Public argument about the constitution is too often conducted through slogans that collapse under legal scrutiny. Five persistent misreadings—about sovereignty, the Crown, the uncodified constitution, conventions and the Human Rights Act—distort debate and weaken accountability. Correcting them is not pedantry; it is a precondition for better law-making in 2026.
The 2019 prorogation litigation settled a legal question but left a political one unresolved: how short can a parliamentary session be before scrutiny becomes nominal? A statutory minimum sitting period, with narrow emergency exceptions, would discipline the prerogative without handing the courts control of the parliamentary calendar.
Judicial review is often framed as a collision between ministers and judges. In practice, most claims are shaped, settled or stopped at the permission stage, long before a substantive hearing. A centre-right reform agenda should make that early filter more predictable and transparent rather than fighting headline battles over judicial power.
Britain’s constitutional rules are not absent; they are dispersed across conventions, prerogative powers and ministerial guidance. A public constitutional register would catalogue them without creating a written constitution or a new judicial supremacy, and a centre-right government should see transparency as an instrument of accountability rather than a concession to legalism.
The 2026 legislative programme contains several bills whose constitutional significance lies less in their policy aims than in their machinery. This bill-by-bill guide identifies five tests — delegated powers, ouster clauses, devolution, rights and scrutiny timetabling — and argues that centre-right scrutiny should treat process as a conservative principle, not a delaying tactic.
Entick, Anisminic, Miller, Miller and UNISON are invoked constantly in constitutional argument. Read closely, they are narrower — and more instructive — than the slogans suggest. Here is what each decides for 2026.
Ministers already publish fiscal and regulatory impact assessments. They should publish a short constitutional one too, covering rights, devolution, delegated powers and access to justice. This is a centre-right case for clarity in Parliament — and less guesswork in court.